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The Present and Future Regulation of
Plea Bargaining: A Look at Missouri v.
Frye and Lafler v. Cooper
Wesley M. Oliver*
This past term, the Supreme Court recognized in Missouri v. Frye
and Lafler v. Cooper that criminal defendants are entitled to the effec-
tive assistance of their lawyers in the plea negotiation process, just
as they are entitled to effective assistance of counsel at trial.1 Justice
Antonin Scalia dissented from the Court’s opinion in the two plea-
bargaining cases but made some interesting observations about crim-
inal negotiations and the Court’s new role in overseeing them. Plea
bargaining, Scalia explained, ‘‘presents grave risks of prosecutorial
overcharging that effectively compels an innocent defendant to
avoid massive risk by pleading guilty to a lesser offense; and for
guilty defendants it often—perhaps usually—results in a sentence
well below what the law prescribes for the actual crime.’’2 As he
describes, the Court’s recent opinions create a ‘‘whole new field of
constitutionalized criminal procedure: plea-bargaining law.’’3 Even
though this term’s decisions involve only issues of effective assis-
tance of counsel, Scalia concluded that ‘‘it would be foolish to think
that ‘constitutional’ rules governing counsel’s behavior will not be
followed by rules governing the prosecution’s behavior in the plea-
bargaining process.’’4
It is hard to quarrel with much of Justice Scalia’s analysis, except
for his bottom line that the Court should impose no regulation on
the plea-bargaining process. It is hard to see how a system that
* Associate Professor and Director of the Criminal Justice Program, Duquesne Univer-
sity School of Law.
1 Missouri v. Frye, 132 S. Ct. 1399 (2012); Lafler v. Cooper, 132 S. Ct. 1376 (2012).
2 Cooper, 132 S. Ct. at 1397 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
3 Id. at 1391.
4 Id. at 1392 (emphasis in original).
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imposes the sort of risks Scalia describes—and creates an alternative
criminal justice system where defendants are punished quite differ-
ently—should exist without judicial oversight. These latest opinions
recognize the central role that plea bargaining plays in the criminal
justice system and begin to extend the constitutional protections
afforded criminal defendants to this critical stage. Given the growing
role plea bargaining has played in the criminal justice system, the
Court was in many ways simply catching up to an unregulated
modern practice.
The Rise of an Unregulated System of Plea Bargaining
Well over 90 percent of all criminal convictions result from a
defendant’s plea of guilty.5 Most often a defendant agrees to enter
a guilty plea because the prosecution has agreed to drop some of
the charges against him or has agreed to at least recommend a lesser
sentence to the judge. It is quite rare for a defendant to enter a guilty
plea merely hoping the judge will be lenient in the sentence as a
result of his acceptance of responsibility—most of the time his plea
has been exchanged for some type of sentencing consideration. For
most defendants, the prosecutor is the only judge they will
encounter.
It is little wonder that so many cases are resolved in this manner.
Prosecutors have enormous power. They have the power to charge
a variety of crimes—carrying widely varying sentences—for almost
any crime imaginable. Long-existing crimes like felony murder and
conspiracy make defendants liable for very serious conduct even if
their culpability is relatively low. New crimes like RICO (Racketeer
Influenced and Corrupt Organizations) and continuing criminal
enterprise provide prosecutors a way to transform low- to mid-level
misconduct into a crime that is punished quite seriously. Perhaps
most significantly, though, sentencing guidelines and mandatory
minimums have shifted the power of determining how defendants
are sentenced to prosecutors. In a presentencing-guideline world,
judges were able to determine whether a particular defendant’s
conduct called for the sentence typically given for an offense. A
prosecutor’s decision to charge a more serious offense—say felony
murder rather than involuntary manslaughter—was not dispositive
5 See infra note 22 and accompanying text.
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of a defendant’s sentence prior to mandatory minimums and
sentencing guidelines. The judge could recognize that the defen-
dant’s low level of involvement did not justify a sentence typically
associated with felony murder. Since the sentencing guidelines revo-
lution of the 1980s, if the elements of both the greater and lesser
charges are supported by the evidence, the prosecutor can ensure
that the defendant will receive the greater sentence unless he agrees
to some sort of a deal.
Plea bargaining is the modern criminal justice system. While crimi-
nal defendants may not realize it, it is far more important that the
attorneys they select be good at negotiating than at trying cases.
(These are, however, obviously related skills. An attorney’s skill at
trying cases will improve his negotiating position.) Statistically, the
odds of obtaining a favorable disposition are greater in a negotiation
with the prosecutor than they are in a jury trial, filled with its
plethora of constitutional protections.
One reading the opinions of the U.S. Supreme Court prior to this
past term would not, however, have had any sense of the central
role plea bargaining plays in the modern criminal justice system.
Prior to 1970, the Court had not even recognized that a guilty plea
could be offered in exchange for a favorable sentencing consider-
ation. In fact, plea bargaining seemed at odds with a centuries-old
notion that a guilty plea may not be motivated by any promise or
threat of any kind. The Court would find the process of plea bargain-
ing to be legitimate, however, decades before it recognized that it
was subject to any sort of meaningful judicial oversight.
In a series of opinions in the 1970s, the Court held that guilty
pleas were valid even if motivated by the prosecutor’s promise not
to pursue greater punishment (or, alternatively, the prosecutor’s
threat to pursue greater punishment if the plea was not accepted).
In the first decision, Brady v. United States (1970), the Court held that
a defendant’s plea in exchange for a 50-year sentence was voluntary
even though it was motivated by the defendant’s (understandable)
desire to avoid the death penalty.6 Later that same year, in North
Carolina v. Alford (1970), the Court held that another defendant
attempting to avoid the death penalty had entered a voluntary plea,
6 397 U.S. 742, 750 (1970).
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even though he claimed that he had not committed the crime.7 The
Court held that so long as there was a factual foundation to support
the prosecution’s theory, then the plea was valid. The Court empha-
sized in each case that the defendant was represented by counsel
who was capable of advising the appropriate course of action.
Certainly Robert Brady could have been a risk-averse defendant
who would be willing to lie about his involvement in a crime in
order to take the death penalty off the table, but a court (or a public)
worried about an erroneous conviction could satisfy itself that he
had admitted his guilt. Henry Alford insisted on his innocence. One
did not have to ask about hidden motivations in order to determine
why he was willing to enter his plea. The threat of execution alone
motivated his decision. The Court in Alford limited the judicial role
to inquiring into whether there was a ‘‘factual basis’’ for the prosecu-
tion to make the threat that alone induced a plea.8 So long as the
‘‘factual basis’’ was satisfied, the Court would leave the matter to
the prosecutor and defense lawyer to work out whatever deal they
could each live with. For these risk-averse defendants, this meant
any deal that let them live. As Justice Scalia recognized last term,
this dynamic could create a real threat of innocent persons plead-
ing guilty.9
In 1975, the Court placed its imprimatur on a virtually complete
transfer of power from judges and juries to prosecutors to decide
how defendants ought to be punished. The little-known case of
Bordenkircher v. Hayes presented an easy question for the Court that
led to a problematic conclusion.10 Paul Hayes was charged with
stealing a blank check, filling it out for $88.30 and passing it. In
Kentucky at the time, the felony offense of uttering a forged check
carried a sentence of two to ten years at hard labor. The prosecutor
charged the felony and offered Hayes a plea offer of five years at
hard labor. The prosecutor’s offer was hardly generous when only
this one offense is considered. There would have been no reason
for Hayes to have accepted it, except for the fact that Kentucky had
a very rigid three-strikes-and-you’re-out law. Paul Hayes had two
7 400 U.S. 25, 37 (1970).
8 Id. at 38.
9 Cooper, 132 S. Ct. at 1397 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
10 434 U.S. 357 (1978).
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fairly substantial prior felonies—detaining a female (a lesser
included offense to rape) and armed robbery. Even though his latest
crime arguably should not have been charged as a felony at all, the
property-crime offense under which Hayes was charged gave the
prosecutor, because it was Hayes’s third felony, the discretion to
seek a life sentence. The prosecutor informed Hayes that if he did
not accept the 5 year sentence, he would seek an indictment under
Kentucky’s habitual criminal act for which a conviction carried a
mandatory life sentence. Hayes refused the offer, went to trial, was
convicted, and received a life sentence for uttering a forged check
for $88.30.
In the Supreme Court, Hayes argued that he had been the victim
of prosecutorial vindictiveness. The prosecutor, Hayes argued, had
sought the life sentence only because Hayes refused to accept a plea
and insisted on his right to a jury trial. Hayes did not argue that a
life sentence for this offense was unconstitutional. He was thus
left with a difficult argument. If a life sentence did not offend the
Constitution, then the prosecutor would not have done anything
wrong if he had sought a life sentence in the first place. Hayes
argued that threatening a life sentence after he brought an initial
charge without the third-strike provision amounted to vindictive-
ness. The prosecutor’s initial charge, absent the third strike, does
suggest something about the penalty the prosecutor deemed appro-
priate for the offense. Of course, had the Court held that the prosecu-
tor had engaged in vindictiveness because of the timing of the threat,
the case would have provided a remedy for Paul Hayes and no
guidance for any subsequent case. Prosecutors attempting to engage
in such vindictiveness in the future would simply seek the life sen-
tence initially and then offer the five-year plea deal.
The Court rejected Hayes’s claim that the prosecutor’s threat to
seek a life sentence unless Hayes pled imposed an unconstitutional
burden of his right to a trial. Unless the Court forbade plea bargain-
ing—or imposed some substantial regulations on it that were not
argued in the case—it was required to find the prosecutor’s decision
to seek a life sentence constitutionally permissible. Yet Bordenkircher
involved an extraordinary power grab by a prosecutor. Consider
the reasons a prosecutor may decide to seek something less than
the maximum penalty permitted by law. A prosecutor may believe
that there are weaknesses in the case and accept a plea to avoid the
261
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risk of an acquittal. He may be willing to offer the defendant some
reduction in the sentence to conserve the resources of his office, or
for the sake of the time and anxiety of witnesses. He may be willing
to offer sentencing consideration for cooperation against other defen-
dants, or with a wider investigation. Finally, he may recognize that
the maximum allowable sentence is excessive given the circum-
stances of the offense.
The facts of Bordenkircher suggest that the prosecutor did not
believe that anything close to a life sentence was appropriate. The
extraordinary difference between a five-year term and a life sentence
can hardly be explained by the prosecutor’s concern about the use
of his office’s resources to try this case. This would have been a
short trial. Nor can the five-year offer be explained by the concerns
that witnesses will suffer from having to testify. There were no
other defendants for Hayes to testify against and no larger criminal
network about which Hayes could offer information. Finally, the
prosecution’s case appeared to have been very solid—the fear of
acquittal certainly did not seem to be a motivating factor. The prose-
cution was thus permitted to threaten a life sentence, which was
completely disproportionate to Hayes’s offense, simply to ensure
that he accepted a plea deal that the prosecution deemed fair.
Bordenkircher was thus the end of a line of cases that legitimized
a transfer of power from judges to prosecutors. With this decision,
it was now clear that prosecutors could bring any charges supported
by probable cause, even if the prosecution believed the defendant
should be punished considerably more leniently.
The American criminal justice system is often favorably compared
to the European continental system by those who observe that
America has an adversarial system while most European countries
have an inquisitorial system. The primary—and most criticized—
characteristic of an inquisitorial system is the role of judge as prose-
cutor. The American adversarial system, it is boasted, has an inde-
pendent evaluator of fact and determiner of sentence, whether judge
or jury. Bordenkircher illustrates the practical reality: American prose-
cutors are judges.
Given the extraordinary range of criminal codes for any given
criminal act, prosecutors are able to charge offenses that carry penal-
ties far more substantial than any prosecutor would deem reason-
able. There is thus a gap between the law on the books and the law,
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not on the street, but actually in the courtroom. Obviously, the larger
the gap, the more likely the defendant will accept the plea.
This gap poses two types of problems. First, consider defendants
likely to be convicted of crimes. If the prosecution can realistically
threaten much more than would be an appropriate sentence in the
minds of most prosecutors, then the defendant has little choice but
to accept whatever the prosecutor has offered, whether reasonable
or simply less than he would receive after a trial. With sentencing
guidelines and mandatory minimums, the prosecutor’s ability to
extract a plea through this means increases. Under modern sentenc-
ing law, judges have much less discretion to conclude that the facts
of the case do not call for a sentence within the range typically given,
or required, in the case of mandatory minimums.
Power has thus largely shifted to the prosecutor to determine the
appropriate sentence—a role proponents of the adversarial system
tout as resting with a neutral and independent judge. Prosecutors
decide the punishment they deem to fit the crime. Defense lawyers
then appeal to the prosecutor’s sense of equity in arguing for a
milder sentence. The prosecutor’s role becomes that of a sentencing
judge, but a judge who is not required to listen to the evidence a
defendant offers. The prosecutor is further not required to consider
how other prosecutors in his jurisdiction or elsewhere have handled
such cases. Indeed, such comparisons are all but impossible, as no
record is kept of how prosecutors go about resolving these cases.
As the bases for these decisions are off-the-record, unlike judicial
decisions, there is no public accountability and no opportunity for
appeal.
The second sort of problem is often regarded as more substantial.
Consider what happens when the prosecution has a relatively weak
case. The risk of acquittal will frequently prompt the prosecutor to
offer a plea to something substantially less serious than the initial
charge. Risk-averse defendants will accept such pleas. Those who
lament the decline of trials observe that pleas in such cases deny
the public an opportunity to see the presentation of evidence. Con-
spiracy theorists were able to offer alternative narratives about the
assassination of Martin Luther King Jr. in part because there was
no public presentation of the evidence. James Earl Ray pled guilty
to avoid death in Tennessee’s electric chair. (Public presentation of
evidence certainly does not always stop the conspiracy theorists—
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alternative theories about President John F. Kennedy’s assassination
abound notwithstanding the Warren Commission’s investigation
and report.)
There is more at stake, however, than a public-confidence issue.
When defendants plead guilty in weak cases in order to avoid the
threat of more serious consequences, it is the prosecutor who has
decided what to do about the weaknesses in the case. Accused spy
Wen Ho Lee, for instance, was released on a sentence of time served
when the prosecution’s case fell apart, and he was offered a deal
that would dismiss 58 counts against him in exchange for a plea to
a minor charge.11 The defense, in arguing that the prosecution should
either dismiss the case (a pipe dream in most cases) or charge a
lesser punishment given the weakness of the case, makes the same
sort of arguments he would make to the jury in closing arguments.
For risk-averse defendants, the prosecutor becomes the finder-of-
fact. Just as for defendants with strong cases, no procedures govern
the consideration that must be given to defense arguments. Durham
County District Attorney Mike Nifong, for example, ignored compel-
ling evidence of innocence in what has come to be called the Duke
Lacrosse rape case.12 In weak cases—those that involve the possibility
of innocence—there is a type of appellate procedure for the defen-
dant. Defendants can always go to trial and take their chances if the
deal offered is not sufficiently generous. Defedants facing serious
charges are, however, frequently quite risk-averse.
Judicial Oversight of Defense Effectiveness in Criminal
Negotiations
Until the very recent Supreme Court decisions, there has been
another aspect of the plea-bargaining process that has remained
unregulated. Defendants have not been entitled to the effective assis-
tance of counsel during the process that leads to the resolution of
the overwhelming majority of criminal cases. The Bill of Rights
recognized the right of a defendant to be represented by counsel at
trial, even though the right to have counsel present at trial was
11 See Mike Dorning, Lee Pleads Guilty, Walks, Chicago Tribune, Sept. 14, 2000, at 1.
12 See, e.g., Lawyers for Indicted Duke Player Seek Rape Accuser’s Cell-Phone
Records, FoxNews.com, May 16, 2002, http://www.foxnews.com/story/
0,2933,195659,00.html.
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relatively new in 1791. In the 20th century, the Supreme Court recog-
nized that this right meant that a defendant was entitled to have a
lawyer even if he could not afford one.13 The Court also concluded
that defendants are entitled to a lawyer who effectively represents
them—both at trial and on appeal.14 Until recently, however, the
Supreme Court’s jurisprudence provided that if a defendant did not
go to trial, then a defendant could only bring an ineffective assistance
of counsel claim if his lawyer had improperly advised taking a plea
rather than going to trial. Under this interpretation of the right to
counsel, a defendant is entitled to an effective trial and appellate
lawyer, but not an effective pretrial negotiator.
The Supreme Court’s jurisprudence on the right to counsel during
negotiations, prior to the recent decisions, was laid out in a case
called Hill v. Lockhart.15 In Hill, the defendant was facing a possible
5-to-50 year sentence (or life) for first-degree murder. Both the
defense lawyer and the prosecutor assumed that William Hill would
be eligible for parole after he served one-third of whatever sentence
he received. On the advice of counsel, the defendant entered a plea
of guilty in exchange for a sentence of 35 years, which everyone
assumed included release eligibility after roughly 12 years. As the
defendant had a prior felony conviction that neither the prosecution
nor defense had discovered, the defendant was not eligible for parole
until he had served half of the sentence he was given.
Hill brought a claim for ineffective assistance of counsel. Hill had
been informed by his lawyer that he was pleading guilty to an
offense for which he would remain in jail for possibly no more than
12 years when he was actually receiving a sentence that required
him to serve at least 5.5 more years. Even if defense counsel was
ineffective in failing to inform him of the particulars of his sentence,
had he been prejudiced? The Supreme Court concluded that he had
not. The Court concluded that Hill had not alleged that he would
have rejected the plea and taken the case to trial had he known of
the actual number of years he would be required to serve. For the
13 Gideon v. Wainright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (providing right to counsel at trial); Douglas
v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963) (providing right to counsel on appeal).
14 Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) (recognizing constitutional right to
effective assistance of trial counsel); Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387 (1985) (recognizing
constitutional right to effective assistance of appellate counsel).
15 474 U.S. 52 (1985).
265
CATO SUPREME COURT REVIEW
Court, a defendant who entered a plea was prejudiced only if there
was a reasonable probability that he would have gone to trial and
been acquitted.16
The Court in Hill further noted that the defendant received the
percentage discount he willingly accepted. His baseline sentence
went from 50 to 35 years. Due to the miscalculation of the parties
in this case, everyone assumed that under both the maximum and
bargained sentence, the defendant could be released after he served
one third of the time. The reality was that he faced a stiffer maximum
than his lawyer (or the prosecutor) realized. Defense counsel’s plea
negotiations reduced the minimum amount of time his client could
serve by the same percentage that it would have been reduced
by under the deal the defendant thought he received. His release
eligibility for the negotiated sentence or for any sentence he received
after a trial would have been altered from the baseline assumptions
of the prosecutor and defense lawyer because of Hill’s prior
conviction.
The Court’s reasoning in Hill recognized no duty on the part of
counsel to plea-bargain effectively. Any deal was acceptable, accord-
ing to the Court, unless the defendant would have gone to trial and
presumably had a realistic chance of prevailing. Otherwise, whatever
concession the defendant obtained from the prosecution, regardless
of his counsel’s failure to acquire information that would have aided
in the negotiation, was beyond the court’s consideration. Justice
Byron White’s concurrence concluded that Hill must not have
informed his attorney about his prior conviction or else the attorney
would not have signed a plea form indicating the defendant had
no priors.17 Had Hill’s attorney been aware of the prior felony and
misinformed his client about his release eligibility, Justice White
would have concluded that Hill stated a cognizable claim.18 For
the majority, though, even if Hill’s counsel was aware of his prior
conviction, it would not have made a difference.
The Court’s analysis rested on an unstated (and hopefully false)
premise—prosecutors are seeking to maximize the amount of time
that every defendant serves. It is possible that Hill’s lawyer could
16 Id. at 59.
17 Id. at 61 (White, J., concurring).
18 Id. at 62–63.
266
The Present and Future Regulation of Plea Bargaining
have used the prior felony to his advantage in the negotiation. Even
though the defendant received the same percentage discount he
expected, the actual minimum sentence was quite different. The
prosecution was satisfied with a judgment that would allow the
parole board to consider the defendant’s release after roughly 12
years. Under the deal actually struck, the parole board could not
consider the defendant’s release for an additional five-and-a-half
years. It is certainly possible that, had the prosecution been aware
of the felony, it would have been unwilling to offer a deal any more
generous than the one it offered. In fact, it may not have been as
generous. But if the prosecution was satisfied with the defendant’s
eligibility for parole in 12 years, perhaps it would have agreed to a
sentence of 24 years. Hill’s lawyer’s decision to ignore the prior
felony was not a strategic one. If, however, Hill’s lawyer did know
about the prior, depending on the reasons for the prosecutor’s agree-
ment for the 35-year sentence, a different deal may have been struck.
A 24-year sentence would have left Hill in jail for a minimum of 12
years, which satisfied the prosecution before it knew of the prior.
The Court’s opinion thus implicitly assumed that such an argument
for a shorter sentence in light of the prior would have gone nowhere.
The Court thus assumed that prosecutors are attempting to maxim-
ize the penalties that defendants face.
Defense counsel after Hill v. Lockhart had no Sixth Amendment
obligation in the plea-bargaining process until Padilla v. Kentucky
(2010).19 In Padilla, the defendant pled guilty to a felony drug crime.
Before he pled, however, he asked his attorney if he could be
deported if he entered the plea. Defense counsel told him that if
immigration authorities had left him in the country this long, that
he had nothing to worry about. The advice was incorrect. A drug
conviction makes even a lawful noncitizen resident deportable,
something defense counsel apparently did not know. The Court
concluded that counsel failed to adequately discharge his Sixth
Amendment obligations when he misinformed his client about the
deportation consequences of his plea. Significantly, Justice John Paul
Stevens’s majority opinion observed that if the defense was aware
that deportation was a consequence of the conviction, he could have
potentially structured a deal with the prosecution for a misdemeanor
19 130 S. Ct. 1473 (2010).
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conviction, or several misdemeanor convictions. Padilla thus not only
imposed a new constitutional burden on defense counsel—to learn
information that might be helpful in plea negotiation—it also painted
a very different picture of prosecutors.20 Implicit in Padilla is the
premise that prosecutors may not always be seeking the maximum
possible punishment in a plea negotiation.
Padilla further began the Court’s new understanding of plea bar-
gaining as an essential part of the criminal justice process during
which a defendant is entitled to effective assistance of counsel. To
some extent, Padilla could be expected. Courts are much more favor-
ably disposed to find a lawyer ineffective when he fails to understand
the law, or fails to discover important facts, than they are when
counsel makes a strategic decision, such as deciding to present evi-
dence he has discovered. In order to make a strategic decision,
counsel must be aware of the law and facts. In José Padilla’s case, his
lawyer was unaware of the law, but Hill’s lawyers were apparently
unfamiliar with relevant facts years earlier and the Supreme Court
was unconcerned. In Hill, the Court concluded that release eligibility
was a collateral issue. In Padilla, the Court was not willing to regard
the threat of deportation as an issue collateral to the plea. The Padilla
Court concluded if counsel’s errors related to deportation, he could
show that his lawyer’s actions had prejudiced him.
Padilla alone, however, did not itself create a right to a lawyer who
satisfies a minimal level of effectiveness in the bargaining process for
20 It was the immigration consequences of the conviction that could have been helpful
to Padilla’s counsel at plea bargaining. As the Court described:
By bringing deportation consequences into this process, the defense
and prosecution may well be able to reach agreements that better
satisfy the interests of both parties. As in this case, a criminal episode
may provide the basis for multiple charges, of which only a subset
mandate deportation following conviction. Counsel who possess the
most rudimentary understanding of the deportation consequences
of a particular criminal offense may be able to plea bargain creatively
with the prosecutor in order to craft a conviction and sentence that
reduce the likelihood of deportation, as by avoiding a conviction
for an offense that automatically triggers the removal consequence.
At the same time, the threat of deportation may provide the defen-
dant with a powerful incentive to plead guilty to an offense that
does not mandate that penalty in exchange for a dismissal of a charge
that does.
Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1486.
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three reasons. First, Padilla dealt with a case that was not taken to
trial. If his lawyer had made him aware of the immigration conse-
quences of a guilty plea, Padilla may have preferred to take his
chances with a jury. Padilla could have been limited to cases in which
defense counsel improperly pled rather than go to trial. Such a ruling
would have been a modest extension of Hill v. Lockhart—and, given
the facts of Padilla, perhaps not much of an extension at all. Second,
Padilla’s lawyer had provided him patently false information that
Padilla requested before entering the plea. Defense counsel had
incorrectly answered a question his client posed to him. Subsequent
cases could have easily cabined the holding to the specific type of
error Padilla’s lawyer made—a mistake regarding the terms of the
plea itself on a topic about which the defendant specifically inquired.
Third, Padilla involved a miscommunication of the legal significance
of the plea deal itself, not the adequacy of Padilla’s lawyer in obtain-
ing the deal. This term’s plea-bargaining cases considered the role
of counsel during the negotiation and determined that counsel is
required to satisfy a minimum standard of competence at that phase.
Frye and Cooper Require Effective Assistance of Counsel in
Criminal Negotiations
The new opinions issued by the Supreme Court on plea bargaining
this term, taken together, rejected any narrow construction that could
have been placed on Padilla. Though they were decided on the same
day, the less remarkable case was issued first. In Missouri v. Frye,
defense counsel failed to convey an offer the prosecutor made to
the defendant on a fourth-offense driving-without-a-license charge.
The prosecution’s offer provided two alternatives. The first possibil-
ity involved a plea to the felony charge: the prosecution would
recommend a three-year sentence with a recommendation that the
defendant Galin Frye, serve 10 days, referred to as ‘‘shock’’ time,
but with no prosecution recommendation on whether the remainder
of the time could be served on probation. The second alternative
would reduce the charge to a misdemeanor that carried a maximum
penalty of one year’s incarceration and the prosecution would rec-
ommend that the defendant serve 90 days. The letter containing
these offers stated that they would expire on December 28, 2007,
unless accepted. Frye’s lawyer did not tell him about the offer and
it expired. Less than a week before the defendant’s preliminary
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hearing, he was arrested again for driving on a revoked license.
When he was arraigned, he entered a plea of guilty to the original
charge of fourth-offense driving on a revoked license. There was no
plea agreement; Frye simply entered a plea of guilty. Interestingly
enough, at sentencing the prosecution made the same recommenda-
tion that it would have under the first alternative communicated to
Frye: a three-year sentence with 10 days of ‘‘shock’’ time and no
recommendation on how much of the rest of the sentence could be
served on probation. The judge sentenced the defendant to three
years in prison.21
Frye’s case was different from Padilla or Hill in that Frye made
no claim that he had not understood the consequences of his plea.
Frye was expecting nothing in exchange for his plea—no deals were
made on sentencing or even on recommendations that the prosecu-
tion would make to the judge. Frye’s complaint on appeal was that
his lawyer had failed him during the negotiation process.
The state argued that while it may have been reasonable to provide
a remedy when defense counsel had failed to explain an aspect of
the plea bargain itself, it was inappropriate to provide a remedy
when defense counsel erred in counseling a defendant to accept or
reject a plea. The terms and legal implications of the plea offer are
easily knowable. The state argued in Frye that courts and prosecutors
are not in a position to know what prompts clients to accept or
reject pleas. Discussions between lawyers and clients are privileged.
Prosecutors may not be aware that clients are getting bad advice
from their lawyers and would be virtually powerless to do anything
if they were aware of this fact.
Justice Anthony Kennedy’s opinion for the majority had a very
practical response to the state’s arguments. ‘‘The State’s contentions
are neither illogical nor without some persuasive force, yet they do
not suffice to overcome a simple reality: Ninety-seven percent of
federal convictions and ninety-four percent of state convictions are
the result of guilty pleas.’’22 The fact that plea bargaining has taken
on such a substantial role in criminal adjudication drove a majority
21 For more background on the case, see Missouri v. Frye, 132 S. Ct. 1399, 1404–05
(2012).
22 Id. at 1407.
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of the Court to extend the protections afforded criminal defendants
to their lawyer’s performance in the negotiation.
The reality is that plea bargains have become so central to
the administration of the criminal justice system that defense
counsel have responsibilities in the plea bargain process,
responsibilities that must be met to render the adequate assis-
tance of counsel that the Sixth Amendment requires in the
criminal process at critical stages. Because ours is for the
most part a system of pleas, not a system of trials, it is
insufficient to point to the guarantee of a fair trial as a back-
stop that inoculates any errors in the pretrial process.23
The Court’s opinion quoted the late Professor William Stuntz and
former Dean Robert Scott for the proposition that plea bargaining
‘‘is not some adjunct to the criminal justice system; it is the criminal
justice system.’’24 Undeniably, Scott and Stuntz are correct. The pro-
cess used to arrive at a criminal conviction in the overwhelming
majority of cases in this country resembles the continental European
inquisitorial system that is frequently the source of scorn by Ameri-
can commentators—but our inquisitorial system operates behind
closed doors, in prosecutors’ offices, in courthouse stairwells, even
occasionally in taverns where prosecutors and defense lawyers final-
ize agreements.
As the majority observed, ‘‘To note the prevalence of plea bargain-
ing is not to criticize it. The potential to conserve valuable prosecutor-
ial resources and for defendants to admit their crimes and receive
more favorable terms at sentencing means that a plea agreement
can benefit both parties.’’25 The arguments of staunch defenders of
the American adversarial system of criminal justice notwithstanding,
there is nothing inherently wrong with a system where the prosecu-
tor also serves as fact-finder and sentencing authority. The measure
of the quality of such a system must, however, turn on the extent
to which it includes mechanisms not only to protect the innocent
but also to ensure reasonable sentences. The only issue before the
Court in Cooper and Frye was the quality of counsel’s representation
23 Id. (citation omitted).
24 Id. (quoting Scott & Stuntz, Plea Bargaining as Contract, 101 Yale L. J. 1909, 1012
(1992)) (emphasis in original).
25 Id.
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at the virtually all-important negotiation stage. And given the signifi-
cance of this phase, the Court concluded that the constitutional
guarantee of effective representation extended to plea bargaining.
The Court recognized the difficulty of assessing effective assis-
tance of counsel at plea bargaining. ‘‘The art of negotiation is at
least as nuanced as the art of trial advocacy and it presents questions
farther removed from immediate judicial supervision.’’26 In evaluat-
ing counsel’s performance at trial, however, the Court has found a
way to require a minimum threshold of performance. Tactical
choices generally do not provide a basis for concluding that defense
counsel was ineffective. Courts are, however, much more willing to
find ineffective assistance when defense counsel does not know the
relevant law or fails to adequately investigate the facts of the case.
In Frye, defense counsel’s failure could not be identified as tactical
under the type of reasoning the Court had previously applied to
questions of trial performance. In Frye, the Court recognized that
counsel’s failure violated a basic and easily satisfied ethical require-
ment of criminal and civil representation. Defense counsel failed to
communicate a plea offer to his client. The American Bar Association
Standards for Criminal Justice, adopted by nearly every state, require
lawyers to communicate offers to clients. A lawyer’s communication
of an offer is, of course, a ministerial task. A lawyer could not gain
a tactical advantage by not informing his client of a offer in his case.
As in all ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims, the Court was
concerned about issues of proof. In such cases, courts are often
concerned about the difficulty of resolving credibility issues between
clients and lawyers. The Court reasoned, however, that allowing a
claim that defense counsel failed to communicate an offer does not
raise this issue. A formal offer can be easily reduced to writing or
even made a part of the record. In one state, New Jersey, the prosecu-
tion and defense are required to report the status of settlement
conferences to the judge in open court with the defendant present.
The Court therefore reasoned that it would not be difficult to make
a record of the fact of an offer and to ensure that the client was
made aware of it—or, alternatively, to determine whether the offer
had been communicated to him.
26 Id. at 1408 (quoting Premo v. Moore, 131 S. Ct. 733, 741 (2011)).
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The Court then faced the difficult question of how to determine
whether prejudice resulted from counsel’s errors during the negotia-
tion. First, the Court held that to show prejudice, there must be a
reasonable probability that the earlier plea offer would have been
accepted and that, if the prosecution had the discretion to withdraw
the offer, or the judge had the discretion to reject the plea, that
there was a reasonable probability that neither would have done so.
Applied to the facts of this case, the Court held that ‘‘there appears
to be a reasonable probability’’ that Frye would have accepted the
plea to the misdemeanor charge if it had been communicated to
him, as he ultimately pled to ‘‘a more serious charge with no promise
of a sentencing recommendation.’’27 This conclusion seems at least
debatable. Frye actually received one of the two deals he was
offered—it is not at all clear that he would have chosen the misde-
meanor with its 90-day recommendation over the felony charge,
with no sentencing recommendation beyond the 10 days of ‘‘shock’’
time. And if he would have chosen the felony charge, he actually
received the deal he would have elected.
The Court in Frye did not have to address the question of what
remedy to grant the defendant. If, but for counsel’s errors, he would
have accepted the misdemeanor offer, then he must be resentenced
with a maximum penalty of one year.
Justice Scalia’s dissent, in which he was joined by three other
members of the Court, contends that a defendant only has the right
to a fair trial. Scalia also contends that the Court has now assumed
responsibility for evaluating the adequacy of a process that does not
lend itself to ready standards. Scalia pointed out that in many cases,
it will be difficult to evaluate whether ‘‘counsel’s plea-bargaining
skills, which now must meet a constitutional minimum, are ade-
quate.’’28 Even if Frye presented an easy case for concluding that
counsel’s performance was insufficient, by concluding that defen-
dants are entitled to effective assistance of counsel at the negotiation
phase, subsequent cases will not be so easily resolved.
Justice Scalia further found that even the standard the Court had
to develop for this case was problematic. Even if it was easy to
determine whether this defendant would have accepted the plea,
27 Id. at 1411.
28 Id. at 1412 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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how could a court go about determining whether a prosecutor would
have withdrawn the plea prior to its entry? How could a court
determine whether the trial judge would have accepted the plea?
Justice Scalia observed that ‘‘[t]he plea-bargaining process is a
subject worthy of regulation, since it is the means by which most
criminal convictions are obtained.’’29 He contended, however, that
the Sixth Amendment did not provide the basis for that regulation,
as that amendment ‘‘is concerned not with the fairness of bargaining
but with the fairness of conviction.’’30 Scalia suggested that the legis-
lature was in a better position to regulate plea bargaining, as legisla-
tures could punish attorneys for failing to inform clients of offers,
while the Court was left only with the remedy of ‘‘penalizing
(almost) everyone else by reversing valid convictions or sentences.’’31
Lafler v. Cooper, the companion case to Missouri v. Frye, had much
farther-reaching implications. In Cooper, defense counsel recom-
mended that his client reject a plea offer and go to trial, where he
was convicted and sentenced to a considerably longer term than he
would have received under the terms of the plea offer. Certainly,
one of the most important functions defense counsel performs is
advising clients about the wisdom of taking a settlement offer. A
defendant who is poorly advised to go to trial has not received good
legal advice. But quite often, a defendant who chooses to go to trial
will receive greater punishment than he would have received if he
had not.32 The implications of considering the legal advice that led
a defendant to go to trial could well be enormous. What prevents
every recommendation to go to trial from being the act of an ineffec-
tive lawyer when his client is convicted?
The facts of Cooper illustrate the potential reach of this decision.33
Anthony Cooper was charged with assault with the intent to murder
29 Id. at 1413–14.
30 Id. at 1414.
31 Id.
32 At least this is the conventional wisdom. David Abrams has challenged this assump-
tion in an article that compared sentences that flowed from guilty pleas and trials
in Chicago. Abrams concluded that, statistically, a defendant is likely to receive a
less harsh sentence after trial than after a negotiated plea. David S. Abrams, Is Pleading
Really a Bargain?, 8 J. Empirical Legal Stud. 200 (2011).
33 For more background on the case, see Lafler v. Cooper, 132 S. Ct. 1376, 1383–84
(2012).
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and three lesser offenses in Michigan. The prosecution offered to
dismiss two of the three lesser offenses and recommend a sentence
of 51 to 85 months if he would plead to the remaining two charges.
On the advice of counsel, Cooper rejected this plea offer. A rare on-
the-record proceeding regarding the plea revealed that Cooper’s
attorney informed him that the prosecution would be unable to
prove assault with intent to murder, as Cooper shot his victim below
the waist. The trial court apparently passed on an opportunity to
correct the misinformation given to the defendant and the case pro-
ceeded to trial, where Cooper was convicted and received a manda-
tory minimum sentence of 185 to 360 months.
The State of Michigan conceded that defense counsel’s perfor-
mance was insufficient in advising his client that the trajectory of
the bullet precluded a finding of guilt on the most serious charge.
The question in Cooper was whether prejudice resulted from this
error. Cooper had received a trial, with all the protections required
by the constitutions of Michigan and the United States. Michigan
argued that the Sixth Amendment guarantee of counsel was for the
sole purpose of ensuring the right to a fair trial. Unless errors of
counsel prior to trial affected the fairness of the trial itself, Michigan
argued that the Sixth Amendment provided no remedy.
The Court disagreed, holding that defendants are entitled to effec-
tive assistance of counsel at sentencing and on appeal. The right to
the effective assistance of counsel on appeal is particularly analogous
to the right to counsel during the plea. The Constitution does not
require the prosecution to offer the defendant a plea, just as it does
not require a state to provide a mechanism for appeal.34 Once a
mechanism is provided for appeal, however, a criminal defendant
is entitled to the effective assistance of counsel on appeal.
Further, the Court noted that not all pretrial errors are cured by
a trial. An indictment that is defective because it is handed down
by a grand jury from which all African-Americans have been system-
atically excluded is not cured by a trial.
In Cooper’s case, the Court held, the trial did not cure the injury:
it was the cause of it. The sentence Cooper received as a result of
going to trial was three-and-a-half times longer than it would have
34 Abney v. United States, 431 U.S. 651, 656 (1977).
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been if he had accepted the plea. Of course, the sentence the defen-
dant received after trial was one that the legislature prescribed for
this offense. The Court, however, concluded that the state’s criminal
code was not the appropriate baseline from which to assess whether
counsel’s errors prejudiced the defendant. Bargained-for sentences,
the Court concluded, provide the appropriate point of comparison
for determining whether a defendant has suffered an injury from
his lawyer’s errors in the negotiation phase. ‘‘The favorable sentence
that eluded the defendant in the criminal proceeding appears to be
the sentence he and others in his position would have received
in the ordinary course, absent the failings of counsel.’’35 Quoting
Professor Stephanos Bibas, the Court concluded that the penalty the
legislature designates for a crime ‘‘is like the sticker price for cars:
only an ignorant, ill-advised consumer would view full price as the
norm and anything less a bargain.’’36
The Court concluded that Michigan’s position, that ‘‘a fair trial
wipes clean any deficient performance by defense counsel during
plea bargaining,’’ was untenable.37 ‘‘[That position] ignores the real-
ity that criminal justice today is for the most part a system of pleas,
not a system of trials.’’38
Having found a violation of the right to counsel in Cooper, the
Court turned to the question of remedy. The Court recognized that
the remedy must ‘‘neutralize the taint’’ of his counsel’s poor perform-
ance without granting the defendant a windfall.39 Lower courts
before Cooper dealt with the question of remedy in three ways:
providing no remedy, ordering the prosecution to reinstate the plea
offer, or ordering a new trial.40 Each of these positions presented
substantial problems. Obviously, the Court’s opinion rejected the
position that provided no remedy. Ordering the plea offer reinstated
interfered with separation of powers—a court ordering this remedy
was essentially taking over the prosecutorial role. Ordering a new
35 Cooper, 132 S. Ct. at 1387.
36 Id. (quoting Stephanos Bibas, Regulating the Plea-Bargaining Market: From Caveat
Emptor to Consumer Protection, 99 Cal. L. Rev. 1117, 1138 (2011)).
37 Id. at 1388.
38 Id. at 1381.
39 Id. at 1388 (quoting United States v. Morrison, 449 U.S. 361, 365 (1981)).
40 See David A. Perez, Deal or No Deal?: Remedying Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
During Plea Bargaining, 120 Yale L. J. 1532 (2011).
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trial, a remedy more consistent with the judicial function, may pro-
vide a defendant a windfall. At a minimum, the memories of wit-
nesses will have faded; at worst, some witnesses will be unavailable
or deceased. Further, ordering a new trial does not mean that a new
trial will occur. Ordering a new trial simply restarts the clock on a
criminal prosecution. Plea discussions will begin anew, but now on
a cold case, perhaps one with missing witnesses. The defendant’s
trial position, and therefore his plea-bargaining position, may well
be substantially better than it was when the original plea was
rejected. The remedy that intrudes less on the formal powers of the
prosecutor therefore may be more detrimental to the interests of the
prosecution and grant the defendant a considerable windfall.
The Supreme Court’s opinion in Cooper did not resolve the issue
of remedy, but importantly, the Court did not lock lower courts
into any of the aforementioned categories of remedies. The Court
concluded that judges have discretion to determine how to remedy
the constitutional error that prejudiced the defendant. The Court
observed that there are essentially two types of plea bargains, one
that provides a reduction in the severity of the sentence and one
that reduces the amount or type of charges the defendant faces.
The Court expressly observed that if the rejected plea reduced the
number of years to be served, ‘‘the court may exercise discretion
in determining whether the defendant should receive the term of
imprisonment the government offered in the plea, the sentence he
received at trial, or something in between.’’41 If the rejected plea
involved a reduction of the number or types of charges, the Court
observed that a proper remedy ‘‘may be to require the prosecution
to reoffer the plea proposal’’ but that ‘‘the judge can then exercise
discretion in deciding whether to vacate the conviction from trial
and accept the plea or leave the conviction undisturbed.’’42
What the Court lacked in clarity, it certainly made up for in flexibil-
ity. ‘‘In implementing a remedy in both of these situations, the trial
court must weigh various factors; and the boundaries of proper
discretion need not be defined here. Principles elaborated over time
in decisions of state and federal courts, and in statutes and rules,
41 Cooper, 132 S. Ct. at 1389.
42 Id.
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will serve to give more complete guidance as to the factors that
should bear upon the exercise of the judge’s discretion.’’43
A Preview of Coming Attractions
The Supreme Court opinions in Frye and Cooper in many ways
left more questions open than they answered. For the defendants
involved in cases like these, their main concern is, of course, when
they will be released. The Supreme Court did not answer that ques-
tion and gave the lower courts no guidance on how to consider
modifying their convictions or sentences.
The two opinions did, however, conclude that recommending the
rejection of a plea on the basis of an incorrect assessment of the law
or failing to communicate a plea offer to one’s client amounts to
ineffective assistance of counsel. Beyond these specific holdings,
lower courts—as well as criminal lawyers in general—were alerted
that the Sixth Amendment requires effective assistance of counsel
at the plea-bargaining phase, just as it does at trial.
The remedies that lower courts develop for ineffective assistance
of counsel at the plea stage could have profound effects beyond
defining the role of defense counsel. Courts prior to Frye and Cooper
had opted for one of two remedies—reinstate the plea or order a
new trial. As discussed earlier, each of these approaches is problem-
atic. The Supreme Court’s recent opinions, however, are very clear
that courts have the discretion to tailor remedies for ineffective
assistance of counsel in plea negotiations beyond these two options.
As courts begin to consider remedies for ineffective assistance in
this phase, it seems worthwhile to consider why prosecutors agree
to plea bargains at all. There are essentially four reasons: (1) guarding
against a risk of acquittal on some or all of the charges, (2) preserving
the resources of the office and sparing victims the emotional and
economic costs of testifying, (3) providing an incentive for coopera-
tion, and (4) equitable considerations, such as those that appear to
have prompted the prosecutor in Bordenkircher v. Hayes to agree to
a five-year sentence rather than life.
43 Id.
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Ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims are to be granted—and a
remedy provided—only when the result that flowed from the law-
yer’s failure produced an unfair result.44 In fashioning remedies, it
seems that courts ought to look to the motives of prosecutors in
making the plea offers that were rejected or not communicated to
clients. The equitable considerations that factor into the prosecutor’s
decision to offer a plea seem to relate to the fairness of an outcome
in a criminal case. Considerations of cost saving, risk aversion, and
cooperation seem to be bargained-for exchanges that can no longer
be traded once there has been a conviction. The prosecutor, once
there has been a conviction, has no risk of an acquittal; witnesses
have testified and any possibility of cooperation is considerably less
meaningful, if it exists at all.
Though parsing the amounts of punishment attributable to equita-
ble considerations in mixed-motive offers will, of course, be difficult,
this portion of the plea deal represents the portion of the sentence
reduction that can be attributed to a motive of fairness. Beyond
achieving a remedy consistent with the Supreme Court’s require-
ments for remedies in ineffective-assistance-of-counsel cases, there
will be substantial benefits to relief that provides defendants the
equity they lost through counsel’s errors. As the Court recognized
in Frye and Cooper, it may be good practice to put plea offers in
writing, and perhaps even in the record, to stave off ineffective-
assistance-of-counsel claims. If remedies for ineffective assistance of
counsel are limited to that portion of the deal attributable to equitable
considerations, then prosecutors will have an incentive to explain
how they arrived at the deal.
Prosecutorial decisionmaking has long been regarded as a black
box. The decisions of prosecutors to bring charges, to forego some
charges, and to reduce charges have considerably more impact on the
lives of actual defendants than do most court decisions. Presumably
prosecutors use some criteria in making these very difficult deci-
sions, yet these criteria are rarely known. At a minimum, these
44 See, e.g., Lockhart v. Fretwell, 506 U.S. 364, 366 (1993) (no relief where counsel in
capital case failed to raise objection to aggravating factor that would have been
successful under Eighth Circuit law at the time the objection would have been made,
but objection would not have been successful at time of ineffective-assistance-of-
counsel claim because Eighth Circuit had reversed itself in light of Supreme Court
decision).
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opinions suggest that more about the prosecutorial decisionmaking
process will be public—more prosecutors will reveal their deal so
that it is clear that the defendant knew about the offer. Some prosecu-
tors and judges will follow the New Jersey model of inquiring into
the reasons the plea was rejected to avoid cases like Cooper’s from
going to trial.
If, however, remedies turn on the reasons a plea was offered,
some portion of prosecutors may find it to their advantage to explain
the reasons for the deal offered. This explanation would provide a
record of the quasi-judicial decisions of prosecutors who render
decisions every day for reasons other than those enumerated in
statutes, case law, or sentencing guidelines. These opinions, in other
words, hold the potential of beginning the development of a common
law of plea bargaining.
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